Ralph Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
Ralph Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney : Brief
of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David E. Yocom; Salt Lake County Attorney; Jerry G. Campbell; Deputy County Attorney.
L. Zane Gill; Law Office of L. Zane Gill, P.C..
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, No. 900112 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2489
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
•AtQ 
DOCKET NO. °iOG 1*1 ££ 
* * * * * 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Case No. 900112-CA 
Priority No. 15 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
* * * * * 
L. ZANE GILL (3716) 
Law Office of 
L. ZANE GILL, P.C. 
A Utah Professional Corp. 
50 West Broadway, #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-1046 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
JERRY G. CAMPBELL (0555) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State, #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Telephone: (801) 468-2653 
FILED 
AUG 31990 
COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * * 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Case No. 900112-CA 
Priority No. 15 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
* * * * * 
L. ZANE GILL (3716) 
Law Office of 
L. ZANE GILL, P.C. 
A Utah Professional Corp. 
50 West Broadway, #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-1046 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
JERRY G. CAMPBELL (0555) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State, #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Telephone: (801) 468-2653 
1. PARTIES 
All of the parties are named in the caption. 
2. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page No 
Table of Authorities iv, v 
Statement of Jurisdiction 1 
Statement of Nature of Proceedings 1 
Statement of Issues Presented for Review 1 
Statement of Case 1-11 
Summary of Arguments 11 
Detail of Argument 13 
I. THIS COURT'S JURISDICTION IS NOT INVOKED PURSUANT 
TO SECTION 63-46b-16 U.C.A. AND THE STANDARD 
OF REVIEW IS PRESCRIBED BY RULE 65B(b)(2) 
U.R.C.P 13 
POINT A. THE COURT IS REQUIRED TO CONDUCT ITS 
REVIEW BASED ON THE FACTS AS SET OUT IN 
THE RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE 
LOWER TRIBUNAL 15 
POINT B. THE COURT IS REQUIRED TO DEFER TO 
THE JUDGMENT AND DISCRETION OF THE LOWER 
TRIBUNAL 17 
POINT C. THE COURT'S REVIEW IS LIMITED TO 
WHETHER THE LOWER TRIBUNAL EXCEEDED ITS 
JURISDICTION OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
AND THE COURT MAY NOT SUBSTITUTE ITS 
JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS 18 
II. THE HEARING BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL 
DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS 19 
III. THE CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL DID NOT COMMIT 
REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DID RULE ON THE 
ISSUE OF OFF-DUTY CONDUCT AND ITS 
RELATIONSHIP TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S 
OFFICE 24 
IV. THE CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL DECISION TO UPHOLD 
THE TERMINATION OF THE PETITIONER SHOULD 
BE UPHELD 2 6 
-11-
2. TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT.) 
V. PRIOR CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANT MAY BE USED 
IN PRESCRIBING THE SANCTION TO BE 
IMPOSED 2 
Conclusion 
SALT LAKE COUNTY CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL'S 
DECISION SHOULD BE UPHELD 3 
Addendum 3 
-iii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
PAGE 
CASE AUTHORITY 
CHILD V. SALT LAKE CITY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, 
575 P.2d 195 (Utah, 1978) 14, 16, 25 
CLEVELAND BOARD OF EDUCATION v. LOUDERMILL, 
470 U.S.532, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) 20 
DAMINO v. O'NEILL, 702, F. SUPP. 949, 953, 
(E.D.N.Y.1987) 20 
DAVIS COUNTY V. CLEARFIELD CITY, 756 P.2d 704 
(Utah, 1988) 16, 17, 19 
DENVER & RIO GRANDE RAILROAD v. CENTRAL WEBER SEWER 
DISTRICT, 287 P. 2d 884 (Utah, 1955) 16, 11 
DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES v. PUBLIC 
SERVICE COMMISSION, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah, 1983). 12, 18, 19 
ERKMAN V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF PROVO CITY, 
198 P.2d 238 (Utah,1948) 19, 21 
HARDEE v. KUHLMAN, 581 F.2d 330 (2nd Cir.1978) 23 
HUTCHINSON v. CARTWRIGHT, 692 P.2d 772 (Utah, 1984) 25 
IN THE MATTER OF DISCHARGE OF WAYNE L. JONES, 
720 P.2d 1356 (Utah, 1986) 12, 15, 25 
27, 28 
IN THE MATTER OF WEDERWICZ, 478 A.2d 429 
(N.J.Super. A.D.1984) 30 
LEE V. PROVO CITY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, 
582 P.2d 485 (Utah, 1978) 15, 25, 31 
MARQUEZ V. STATE, 725 S.W.2d 217 (Tex.Cr.App. 1987) 23 
PEATROSS v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE, 
555 P. 2d 281 (Utah, 1976) 17 
PHILADELPHIA CIVIL SERVICE COMMISION V. WOJTUSIK, 
525 A.2d 1255 (Pa.Cmwith. 1987) 26 
POWELL V. MIKULECKY, 891 F.2d 1454 (10th Cir. 1989) 20 
PRICE V. BOARD OF FIRE & POLICE COMMISSIONERS, 
487 N.E.2d 673 (111. App. 4 Dist. 1985) 30 
iv 
CASE AUTHORITY 
PAGE 
ROACH V. NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 
804 F.2d 1147, 1160 (10th Cir. 1986) 20 
SHEEHAN V. BOARD OF FIRE AND POLICE COMMISSIONER OF 
PES PLAINES, 509 N.E. 2d 467 (Ill.App. 1987) 21 
TAYLOR v. UTAH STATE TRAINING SCHOOL 
775 P.2d 250 (Ut. App. 1989) 18 
UNITED STATES v. Lumkin, 767 F.2d 1182 (1982) 22 
VETTERLI V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF SALT LAKE CITY, 145 P.2d 792 (Utah, 1944) 1, 12, 
26, 27, 
31 
WHITMORE V. CIVIL SERVICE MERIT BOARD OF SHELBY, 
673 S.W.2d 535 (Term. 1984) 26 
WILSON V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
735 P.2d 403 (Utah, 1987) 20, 22 
XANTHOS v. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
685 P.2d 1032 (Utah, 1984) ...16, 18 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
Rule 65B(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 1, 14, 15 
16, 18 
Utah Code 1988, Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) and (b) l 
Utah Code 1988, Section 63-46b-16 11, 13 
Utah Code 1981, Section 17-33-1 14 
Utah Code 1987, Section 77-la-l(l) (a) (vi) 2 
OTHER AUTHORITY 
McQuillin Mun. Corp. Section 45.86 (3rd Ed.) 31 
v 
4. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 
78-2a-3(2)(a)(b). 
5, NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Appellant's appeal is from an order from the Third 
District Court affirming the decision of the Salt Lake County 
Career Service Council termination of the Appellant's employment 
with Salt Lake County, 
6. THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
a. Whether Rule 65B(b)(2) U.R.C.P., governs the standard 
of review. 
b. Whether the hearing held before the Career Service 
Council comported with minimum due process requirement. 
c. Whether this Court should set aside the Decision of 
the Salt Lake County Career Service Council. 
d. Whether the test set forth in Vetterli v. Civil 
Service Commission of Salt Lake City, is applicable to the 
above-entitled case. 
e. Can prior misconduct of the Appellant be used by his 
employer to determine the severity of a penalty? 
7. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves an appeal from an order denying the 
Appellant's Petition for Extraordinary Relief brought pursuant to 
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Rule 65B(b)(2)/ U.R.C.P. The following facts were found by the 
Salt Lake County Career Service Council in their written Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision, dated 3rd day of 
December, 1986. (See Addendum 2). 
1. Ralph Tolman was hired from the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Department as an investigator for the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office. (Transcript P.641, L.21-25). 
2. The responsibilities and duties of an investigator of 
the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office were the same 
responsibilities and duties as a law enforcement officer for the 
State of Utah and required peace officer certification. 
(Transcript P.750, L.23-25, P.751, L.l-16, P.641, L.16-22, i.e., 
Section 77-la-l(l)(a)(vi) U.C.A., 1953, as amended). 
3. On June 5, 1981, at 12:10 a.m., Tropper Terry 
McKinnon, of the Utah Highway Patrol stopped a blue AMC Hornet 
driven by Ralph Tolman. (Transcript P.77, L.l-20, P.78, L.22-24). 
4. Mr. Tolman was driving a Salt Lake County Attorney 
vehicle which had a police radio and he informed Trooper McKinnon 
that he had a gun in the glove box. (Transcript P.78, L2-4, 
20-24, P.86, L.24-25). 
5. Trooper McKinnon smelled an odor of alcohol on 
Tolman, determined that he was driving under the influence or 
impaired and arrested him. (Transcript P.79, L.4-5, P.81, L.22-25, 
P.82, L.2-4). 
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6. Mr. Tolman was transported to the Murray City P.D. 
Department where a breathalizer test was administered. 
(Transcript P.82, L.2-4, P.83, L.13-14, P.84, L.12-25). 
7. The results of the breathalyzer test showed a blood 
alcohol level of .11%. (Transcript P.85, L.6). 
8. Tolman was released to Sgt. Granes while Trooper 
McKinnon was concerned with what to do with the County Attorney's 
car. (Transcript P.85, L.9-10, P.86, L.24-25, P.87, L.l-4). 
9. Ralph Tolman entered a plea in the above matter to 
Reckless Driving. (Transcript P.79 and 80). 
10. Don Sawaya, Chief Deputy of the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office, verbally warned Mr. Tolman that any further 
repetition would result in his termination. (Transcript P.92, 
L.15-21, P.93, L.l-10, L.16-24). 
11. As disciplinary action, Mr. Tolman was given five (5) 
days off without pay, however he was allowed to forfeit five 
compensatory days. (Transcript P.95, P.292, L.4-24, P. 293, 
L.l-7). 
12. Mr. Tolman did not challenge the fact that he had 
been arrested for a D.U.I, by Trooper McKinnon and he admitted 
that he had plead guilty to Reckless Driving. (Transcript P. 661, 
L.18-25, P.662, L.l-4). 
13. In 1983 or 1984, Mr. Tolman, was observed exiting the 
Sage Lounge by Officers Tom Cowan and Sgt. Tim Start of the 
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Midvale Police Department. (Transcript P.Ill, L. 21-24, P.Ill, 
L.12-20, P.744, L.6-7). 
14. Tolman staggered or walked very unsteadily to his car 
and got in. The officers observed him start his car and the brake 
lights came on. (Transcript P.112, L.7-21, P.112, L.23-25, P.744, 
L.11-12 and L.24-25). 
15. Tolman7s vehicle was blocked by Sgt. Start. Both 
officers stated they smelled an odor of alcohol on Tolman and 
concluded that he was under the influence of an intoxicant. 
(Transcript P.113, L.21-25, P.114, L.3-10, P.119, L.6-7, P.745, 
L.4-5, P.745, L22-25). 
16. Tolman was belligerent and irrate and did not want 
the officers to find him an alternate way home. (Transcript 
P.114, L.18-24, P.129, L.7-12). 
17. Sgt. Start was reluctant to arrest Tolman because of 
his position as a investigator for the Salt Lake County Attorney 
Office. (Transcript P.122, L.2-4, P.744, L.13-18, P.746, L.17-18). 
18. Tolman did not contest that he was at the Sage Lounge 
or that he had been drinking, but only challenged the officers' 
version of whether or not he entered his vehicle and started it. 
(Transcript P.688). 
19. The Salt Lake County Career Service Council chose not 
to accept the version of Tolman and his ex-wife, Linda, but 
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rather accepted the testimony of the officers as being more 
credible. 
20. On August 18, 1986, at 17th South and 11th East, 
Ralph Tolman was arrested for driving under the influence of 
alcohol by Salt Lake City Police Officers Muniz and Hendenstrom. 
(Transcript P.131, L.24-25, P.132, L.10-11, P.132, L.5-8, P.133, 
L.25). 
21. Tolman identified himself with his driver's license 
and his Salt Lake County Attorney identification card. 
(Transcript P.134, L.10-11). 
22. His eyes were blood shot, he smelled of alcohol and 
both officers were of the opinion that he was under the influence 
of alcohol. (Transcript P.134, L.22-24, P.140, L.21-24, P.154, 
L.l-2). 
23. Officer Hendenstrom administered five field sobriety 
tests, they were: (1) one leg stand; (2) nine step walk; (3) 
finger count; (4) modify attention; and (5) eye gage test. 
(Transcript P.151, P.152, P.153, L.16-18). Hendenstrom asked 
Tolman why he was trying to tell him where he was employed. 
(Transcript P.154, L.19-20). While being transported to the Salt 
Lake County Jail, Tolman told Officer Hendenstrom that he would 
probably lose his job. (Transcript P.156, L.18-19). 
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24. Officer Hendenstrom administered the Intoxilizer 
machine test to Tolman and received a result of .152%, which is 
almost twice the legal limit. (Transcript P.157-58, P.159, L.8-14). 
25. The Salt Lake County Career Service Council found 
that this incident occurred while Mr. Tolman was off-duty. 
(Transcript P.132, L.4-18). 
26. Mr. Tolman admitted that he plead guilty to a 
alcohol-related offense of reckless driving which arose from this 
event. (Transcript P.717, L.5-6). 
27. On June 10, 1986, in the evening hours, Ralph Tolman 
went to the home of Margo Bergvall, with whom he had previously 
lived. (Transcript P.692, L.14-20, P.173, L.13-17, P.174 and 175). 
28. Bergvall and Tolman's relationship had ended in May 
of 1986. (Transcript P.171, L.4-6). 
29. On June 10, Bergvall and a fellow co-worker, Dave 
Nielsen had been to an office party at Aggies7 and had gone to 
Bergvall's house. (Transcript P.173, L.13-24). 
30. Both Bergvall and Nielsen got into her hot tub, and 
... subsequently, Tolman found them in the hot tub and began 
yelling obscentities. (Transcript P.175, L.14-18, P.248, L.13-19, 
P.696, L.2-8). 
31. Tolman grabbed Mr. Nielson by the testicles while 
Bergvall and Nielsen fled into the house. (Transcript P.17 6, 
P.248, L.22-25, P.696, L2-8). 
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32. Tolman forced his way into the house where a struggle 
ensued. (Transcript P.176). 
33. Tolman threw Bergvall into her glass table, breaking 
it. (Transcript P.176, L.18-22, P.696, L.18-25). 
34. Tolman then grabbed Nielsen with a choke hold and 
they struggled. (Transcript P.177, L.4-8, and L.16-18). 
35. Tolman grabbed Bergvall again and threw her against 
the refrigerator, causing her to hit her head. (Transcript P.177, 
L.4-8, P.251, L.l-10). 
36. Tolman then grabbed Nielsen in another choke hold and 
tried to push him through the kitchen window. The window was 
broken and Tolman cut his arm. (Transcript P.178, P.544, L2-9, 
P.250, L.15-20). 
37. After things settled down, Tolman left and Bergvall 
asked Nielsen to stay because she was frightened. (Transcript 
P.179, L.20-24, P.254, L.6-8). 
38. The next morning, June 11, 1986, at about 8:00 a.m., 
Ralph Tolman returned and entered the home of Margo Bergvall 
uninvited. He saw Dave Nielsen asleep on the couch and proceeded 
to grab him by the testicles. (Transcript P.180, L.7-25, P.254, 
L.6-8, L.11-21, and P.545, L.15-16). 
39. Tolman told Nielsen that he was going to kill him and 
then began to kick Nielsen in the head and chest. (Transcript 
P.180, L.18-25, P.254 L.17-21, P.255, L.21-25, P.545, L.22-24). 
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40. Tolman had been on his way to work on June 11, 1986, 
when he stopped at Bergvall/s house, forcibly entered and 
assaulted Dave Nielsen. (Transcript 700 L.2-4, P.180 and P.181). 
41. Nielsen was allowed to dress while Tolman made more 
threats on his life, and he left the residence. (Transcript 
P.256, L.15-16). 
42. Tolman subsequently left Bergvall's house and went to 
his ex-wife's place of business and proceeded to tell her of the 
events of that morning. (Transcript P.701, P.702). 
43. After spending the morning and the lunch hour with 
his ex-wife, Linda Tolman, Tolman returned to work. (Transcript 
P.702). 
44. Additionally, there was no factual dispute that a 
assault occurred at Margo Bergvall's residence on June 10 and 
11th, as testified to by Tolman and his witnesses. (Transcript 
543, P.544, P.545, and P.696-701). 
45. In January of 1986, a meeting was called by Don 
Harmon, Chief Agent of the Investigators of the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office, to discuss a change in policy regarding the 
personal use of County Attorney vehicles. (Transcript P.2 61, 
L.17-24, P.262, L.3-7, P.261, L.17-25). 
46. The directive given to the investigators was that the 
County Attorney vehicles assigned to them could only be used for 
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offical business and not for personal use. (Transcript P.263, 
L.10-11, P.309, L.4-6, P.669, L.22-25). 
47. The vehicle assigned to Tolman was initially a 
Chevrolet Citation but in the summer of 1986, he was assigned a 
brown Chevrolet Celebrity. (Transcript P.265, L.6-14). 
48. Harmon conducted checks on several Fridays and the 
following Mondays of the mileage readings of investigators' 
vehicles. He determined that Tolman's vehicle was used for 
personal use on the three occassions that he checked. (Transcipt 
P.295, L.15-19, L.22-25, P.296, L6-13, L.20-25, P.265, L.21-25, 
and P.266, L.20-25). 
49. Harmon gave Tolman a written reprimand for disobeying 
his directive. (Transcript P.268, L.3-13). 
50. The private use of the County Attorney's vehicle by 
Tolman was also shown by the testimony of Dave Nielsen, who stated 
that on August 8, 1986, in the early morning hours, he saw Ralph 
getting into his brown Chevrolet Celebrity after Nielsen was 
leaving a party at Bergvall's. (Transcript P.257, L.9-15, P.259, 
L.8-14). 
51. On October 8, 1985, Ralph Tolman and Jim Burns of the 
Salt Lake County Attorney's office were going into the City and 
County Building when they saw John Harrington of KTVX Television 
station. (Transcript P.309, L.18-22, P.310, L.1-5, P.415, L.13-25, 
P.678, L.12-25). 
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52. Tolman called Harrington "Yellow Hair", which was in 
reference to a confrontation that Harrington had with Indians in 
the Wind River area of the week before. (Transcript P.312, 
L.15-25, P.313, L.l-8, P.416, L.l-12, P.678, L.19-25). 
53. A violent verbal exchange followed between Tolman and 
Harrington. (Transcript P.416, L.l-12). 
54. Gross obscenities were used by both Tolman and 
Harrington. (Transcript P.317, L.10-12, P.418, L.14-15, P.678, 
L.19-25). 
55. Harrington thought that Tolman had been drinking, and 
that Tolman was going to physically strike him. (Transcript 
P.418, P.440, L.3-7). 
56. Harrington thought Tolman was going to hit him when 
he had his hands in his pockets. (Transcript P.440, L.8-9). 
57. Jim Burns grabbed Tolman and physically took him into 
the building. (Transcript P.418, L.18-25). 
58. Sam Dawson, Ralph Tolman's immediate supervisor, was 
requested by Bud Ellett, Chief Deputy of the Justice Division, to 
go to KTVX and defuse the situation if possible. (Transcript 
P.309, L.18-22, P.311, L.14-16). 
59. The verbal confrontation between Harrington and 
Tolman was observed by several newsmen, who were there to cover 
the Ronnie Lee Gardner trial. (Transcript P.470, L.6-9, P.310, 
L.l-5, P.415, L.13-25). 
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60, Harrington filed criminal charges against Tolman with 
the Salt Lake City Attorney's Office, but dropped them two weeks 
later. (Transcript P.419, L.l-3, P.423, L.l-10). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case involves the termination of the Appellant, Ralph 
Tolman, from his position as a investigator for the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's office. As a investigator, the Appellant 
performed many of the same duties as a peace officer of the State 
of Utah and was required to be peace officer certified. 
The Salt Lake County Attorney's office listed six 
allegations of misconduct which it believed was sufficient to 
sustain a termination. The record reflects no dispute that the 
six incidents occurred, the only contention of the Appellant is 
that the Salt Lake County Career Service Council failed to see the 
facts in the same light in which the Appellant believed them to 
be. This Court cannot substitute its judgment of what the facts 
are but must defer to the findings of the Salt Lake County Career 
Service Council. 
The Appellant asserts that this Court's jurisdiction is 
invoked by Section 63-46b-16 U.C.A.; however, this is incorrect 
for this appeal comes to this Court as an appeal from a denial of 
Appellant's petition for a Extraordinary Writ pursuant to rule 
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65B(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The basis for 
review under 65B is whether or not the Salt Lake County Career 
Service Council abused its discretion or exceeded its 
jurisdiction. This statutory standard is then reviewed under the 
tests enunciated in Department of Administrative Services v. 
Public Service Commission, (see infra.). 
The record of the hearing before the Salt Lake County 
Career Service Council reflects that the Appellant was given his 
due process rights and his assertion that the Career Service 
Council failed to consider and rule on the issue of nexus is 
erroneous. Additionally, the admission of heresay testimony was 
merely corroborative and not disputed by the Appellant. 
The Appellant asks this Court to substitute its judgment 
for that of the lower tribunal (Salt Lake County Career Service 
Council) and mitigate the decision of the County Attorney's office 
and that of the Career Service Council. If this Court adopted his 
argument, it would require a change from the Supreme Court's 
decisions in Vetterli and the Discharge of Jones. (See infra). 
The record is documented with testimony of numerous 
witnesses who substantiated the allegations of the County 
Attorney's office that the Appellant, as a peace officer of the 
State of Utah, is required to maintain his private life as example 
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to all. Therefore, Salt Lake County respectfully reguests that 
this Court uphold the decision of the Salt Lake County Career 
Service Council and that of Judge Noel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THIS COURT'S JURISDICTION IS NOT 
INVOKED PURSUANT TO SECTION 
63-46b-16 U.C.A. AND THE STANDARD 
OF REVIEW IS PRESCRIBED BY RULE 
65B(b)(2) U.R.C.P. 
The Appellant, in his brief to this Court, has cited 
Section 63-46b-16, Utah Code Annotated, as the authority for which 
he asks the Court to reverse the decision of the Career Service 
Council and the District Court. Section 63-46b-16(l) sets forth 
the jurisdictional authority by which the Court of Appeals may 
"review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings." However, 63-46b-l et.seg., "The Administrative 
Procedures Act," does not apply to Salt Lake County. The 
legislature specifically excluded political subdivisions of the 
State of Utah from the definition of "Agency", i.e., 
63-46b-2(1)(b). Salt Lake County is a political subdivision of 
the State of Utah and, therefore, for Appellant to assert that 
this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 63-46b-16 is erroneous and 
any arguments that the standard of review falls under the 
Administrative Procedure Act should be stricken. 
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The Appellant's appeal contests the order of Judge Noel, 
which denied his Petition for Extraordinary Relief. The 
Appellant's appeal of the Career Service Council was brought 
pursuant to Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See 
attached Addendum 3). 
The Appellant was terminated by the Salt Lake County 
Attorney office pursuant to the policies adopted by Salt Lake 
County through authority granted by the "County Personnel 
Management Act". (17-33-1. et.seq.) This act provides for a 
independent bipartisian council to hear all disciplinary actions, 
including terminations, that are not resolved. Section 17-33-4(1) 
states in part that the decisions of the Career Service Council 
are final and binding. "However, a right of appeal to the District 
Court under the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
shall not be abridged." The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides for an appeal through Rule 65B entitled "Extrordinary 
Writs". 65B(b)(2) provides in part: 
"Appropriate relief may be granted...where an 
inferior tribunal, board or officer exercising 
judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction 
or abused its discretion;" 
Several Utah cases have held that the proper statutory 
authority for review of similar cases is found under Rule 
65B(b)(2) i.e., Child v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission, 
575 P.2d 195 (Utah, 1978), Child petitioned the Court for a 
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review of his discharge as a police officer pursuant to Rule 
65B(b)(2); Lee v. Provo City Civil Service Commission, 582 P.2d 
485 (Utah, 1978), Lee appealed his dismissal as a police officer 
for a extramarital affair; In the Matter of the Discharge of Wayne 
L. Jones, 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah, 1986), sheriff appealed the 
decision of the merit commission and the District Court affirmance 
thereof. 
POINT A 
THE COURT IS REQUIRED TO CONDUCT 
ITS REVIEW BASED ON THE FACTS AS 
SET OUT IN THE RECORD OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE LOWER 
TRIBUNAL 
The appeal of Ralph Tolman from the judgment of the 
District Court, which acted as an appellate court, comes to this 
Court for review as if it had come directly from the Salt Lake 
Career Service Council. In the matter of Wayne L. Jones, p.13 60 
supra. The Supreme Court has held in similar cases that the 
nature and extent of a review of a lower tribunal's decision 
depends on what happened in the tribunal below, as reflected by 
its record. Only under limited circumstances may the reviewing 
court go beyond the record and take new evidence. If, in fact, 
there was no hearing below or no record was kept, the Court can 
review the facts itself. Where, however, the lower tribunal 
conducted a recorded hearing, took evidence, heard sworn 
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witnesses, or generally comported with due process requirements 
and made its decision on facts derived from that hearing, a 
reviewing Court is limited to the record of the lower tribunal. 
Denver & Rio Grande v. Central Weber Sewer Imp. Dist., 287 P.2d 
844 (Utah, 1955); Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake 
City, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah, 1984); and Davis County v. Clearfield 
City, 756 P.2d 1278 (Utah, 1988). For instance, in the Davis 
County decision, the Court found that the city council had held a 
"secret meeting" in which a record was not kept and the council's 
decision was apparently made. Further, the council's ruling 
included no findings of fact nor reasons for its decision; under 
these circumstances, the Court found that it was appropriate to 
take evidence. The Supreme Court has further held that District 
Courts are limited to taking evidence under circumstances similar 
to those at issue only when it is necessary to do so based on the 
inadequacy of the record. Otherwise Summary Judgment based on a 
review of the record is the appropriate remedy. Child, supra. 
This procedure is set out in Rule 65B itself. 
Subparagraph (e) as that Rule provides that where the Court 
determines it is appropriate to issue a writ, "it shall be 
directed to the inferior tribunal, board or officer, or to any 
other person having custody of the record or proceedings, 
commanding such tribunal, board or officer to certify fully to the 
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Court issuing the writ within a specified time, a transcript of 
the record and proceedings.•." 
POINT B 
THE COURT IS REQUIRED TO DEFER TO 
THE JUDGMENT AND DISCRETION OF THE 
LOWER TRIBUNAL. 
It is an axiom of this type of review, regardless of 
whether the District Court made its decision based on the record 
or takes evidence beyond the record, that this Court is required 
to defer to the judgment and discretion of the lower tribunal, 
i.e., Salt Lake County Career Service Council. The Davis County 
case found that even where a District Court goes beyond the record 
to take evidence, it is still mandated to determine the basis of 
the lower tribunals decision and give deference to that decision 
— not to take evidence on the merits of the matter before the 
lower tribunal and decide on its own what is the best decision on 
the merits. Where the lower tribunal conducted a hearing and 
arrived at a decision, the reviewing court may not interfere with 
the discretion of the lower tribunal. Peatross v. Board of 
Commissioners of S.L. Co., 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976). 
Further, a reviewing court is obligated, when it is 
dealing with a lower tribunal which has specialized knowledge in a 
particular field, such as a planning and zoning board or, as in 
this case, the Career Service Council, to allow a comparatively 
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wider latitude of discretion and a presumption of correctness of 
the decision of that lower tribunal. This Court under the facts 
presented to the Salt Lake County Career Service Council should 
not lightly interfere with that body's decision. Xanthos, supra. 
POINT C 
THE COURT'S REVIEW IS LIMITED TO 
WHETHER THE LOWER TRIBUNAL EXCEEDED 
ITS JURISDICTION OR ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION AND THE COURT MAY NOT 
SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGMENT ON THE 
MERITS. 
The Appellant, in his appeal brief, sets forth the 
standard for review that was promulgated by the Supreme Court in 
the Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service 
Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983) and followed by this Court in 
the case of Taylor v. Utah State Training School, 775 P.2d 432 
(Ut. App. 1989). However, the standard explained in these cases 
does not overturn previous decisions concerning the standard of 
review, but only clarifies them. The continuum of review as 
explained by Justice Oaks in Administrative Services is applied to 
whether the Salt Lake County Career Service Council abused its 
discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction. Review is limited to the 
guestion of abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction. It is 
not within the Court's prerogative to substitute its judgment if 
the record discloses that there was a reasonable basis for the 
decision below. Xanthos, supra,. Rule 65B(b)(2) has, itself, 
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clarified the standard of review in such cases holding that review 
does not extend to the merits of the decision, but solely to 
whether the inferior tribunal, Salt Lake Career Service Council, 
abused its discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction. 
"Abuse of discretion" is not an undefined standard; 
rather, it refers to acting arbitrarily or without a basis in 
reason and the Findings of Fact will only be upset where they are 
so without foundation they must be deemed capricious and 
arbitrary. Utah Dept. of Admin. Services, p.608. For instance, a 
lower tribunal's refusal to provide written findings of fact may 
suggest that there is no rational basis for its decision and thus 
its decision may well have been arrived at arbitrarily. Davis 
County, supra. Minor irregularities in the decision process are 
not by themselves sufficient to constitute arbitrariness or acting 
without a basis in reason. Absent such arbitrariness or lack of 
factual basis, the reviewing court cannot disturb the lower 
tribunal's findings. Erkman v. Civil Service Commission of Provo 
City, 198 P.2d 238 (Utah, 1948). 
II 
THE HEARING BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE 
COUNCIL DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS 
The Appellant asserts in his appeal that he was not given a 
fair hearing for the reason that the Career Service Council allowed 
Sam Dawson to relate Dave Nielson's testimony, that the Council 
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failed to rule that evidence of off-duty conduct could not be 
presented, and that there was prejudice because a deputy Salt Lake 
County Sheriff was present throughout the hearing. There is 
nothing in the record submitted to this Court that demonstrates an 
unfair hearing. "Due process entitles an individual in an 
administrative proceeding to a fair hearing before an impartial 
tribunal..." However, "a substantial showing of personal bias is 
required to disqualify a hearing officer or obtain a ruling that a 
hearing is unfair." Roach v. National Transportation Safety Board, 
804 F.2d 1147, 1160 (10th Cir. 1986). The minimum level of due 
process required at an administrative hearing does not rise to the 
same standards set for litigation in a court. "It is well settled 
under federal and state law that due process consideration does not 
require the full array of procedural tools available to a plaintiff 
in a administrative hearing." Damino v. O'Neill, 702 F.Supp. 
949,953 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); e.g., Cleveland Board of Education v. 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Powell v. 
Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454 (10th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court of 
Utah has also spoken to the difference between administrative 
hearings and trials. In the case of Wilson v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 735 P.2d 403 (Utah, 1987); the Court stated: 
"this Court has long recognized that there are significant 
differences between court trials and proceedings before 
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administrative agencies and that the technical rules of evidence 
need not be applied before the latter." e.g., Erkman, Supra. 
The procedures that ensure a fair hearing under the Due 
Process Clause are as follows: (1) prior notice of the charges 
(the Appellant was given the notice of intent to terminate on 
September 8th of 1986, which set forth the specific allegations, 
see Addendum 1); (2) a hearing before an impartial panel (hearing 
commenced on November 3rd of 1986, and required almost one month to 
complete and the record is filled with rulings where the Council 
stated it wanted to hear all the evidence, Transcript p.33, 
L.13-18, and it allowed each side to present its evidence); (3) 
representation by legal counsel (Appellants' present counsel 
represented him in the hearing before the Career Service Council); 
(4) cross-examination of the witnesses (the record speaks for 
itself); (5) to present evidence in his own behalf. (The record 
speaks for itself); and (6) Appellant's right to inspect 
documentary evidence against him (the record speaks for itself). 
Sheehan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners of Pes Plaines, 509 
N.E. 2d 467 (111. App. 1987). 
In reference to Appellant's allegation of improper use of 
hearsay testimony presented by Investigator Sam Dawson, he fails to 
point out that the County Attorney's office presented the following 
facts to the Career Service Council: (1) Margo Bergvall was called 
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upon and testified of the events of June 10, and June 11, 1986, 
regarding the Appellant, herself and Dave Nielsen; (2) that Dave 
Nielsen was identified as a witness by the County Attorney's 
Office; (3) that he was served a subpoena by County Attorney's 
office to appear before the Career Service Council on a date 
certain; (4) that he was contacted by telephone on the date of his 
appearance and informed the County Attorney's office that he would 
not appear; (5) that Sam Dawson interviewed Dave Nielsen on October 
29, 1986 and testified concerning that conversation; and (6) that 
the testimony of Dave Nielsen corroborated the testimony already 
given by Margo Bergvall. (Transcript P.239, L.8-17, P.241, P.244, 
L.10-15). Additionally, there was no evidence presented at the 
hearing that the Appellant himself sought to subpoena Mr. Nielsen. 
The Career Service Council made a rational decision regarding the 
admission of Sam Dawson's testimony based upon the facts before 
it. (Transcript P.244, L.14-24). Additionally, the Career Service 
Council was aware of Salt Lake County Policy 5710, 7.0, which 
states that hearings will not be bound by legal procedures nor 
legal rules rules of evidence, and United States v. Lumkin, 767 
F.2d 1182 (1982) which allowed the use of hearsay testimony in a 
murder trial. (Transcript P.234). 
There is no case in Utah which states that hearsay is not 
admissible in an administrative hearing. In Wilson, cited supra, 
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the Supreme Court of Utah stated: "Hearsay evidence is admissible 
in proceedings before administrative agencies. However, findings 
of fact cannot be based exclusively on hearsay evidence." p.404 
The finding of fact #6 was not based exclusively upon the hearsay 
testimony of Dave Nielsen and therefore no due process rights of 
the Appellant were violated. 
The Appellant has alleged that the Career Service Council's 
decision to allow an armed deputy sheriff to be present throughout 
the hearing had a prejudical effect upon the Council, and 
therefore, the Appellant was denied due process. As set forth 
previously, a administrative hearing is not required to comport 
with the same procedural safeguards as that of a trial. However, 
even in a criminal setting, the presence of an armed guard at a 
trial in front of a jury has been held not to violate the 
defendant's due process rights. Hardee v. Kuhlman, 581 F.2d 330 
(2nd. Cir. 1978) Compelling a defendant to appear before a jury 
wearing handcuffs and leg irons held not to be a denial of due 
process. Marquez v. State, 725 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987). 
There is nothing in the record which would point to how the 
Appellant was prejudiced by the presence of a deputy sheriff, and 
therefore respondent submits that Appellant's due process rights 
were not violated. 
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Ill 
THE CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL DID NOT 
COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DID RULE 
ON THE ISSUE OF OFF-DUTY CONDUCT AND 
ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE COUNTY 
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, 
In the pre-hearing conference before the Career Service 
Council, the Appellant asked the Council to rule that any evidence 
of off-duty conduct not be heard or used as a basis for 
termination. The Appellant alleges that the Council failed to 
make a ruling upon the issue of "nexus" between the employment and 
the off-duty actions of the Appellant. This is not accurate or 
true. The chairman of the Career Service Council stated: "First 
of all, I'd like to explain that we view this hearing really as a 
fact finding, information gathering hearing. And that Council 
members, ... have a great responsibility to listen to the evidence 
and weigh the evidence and give the value to it that should be 
given. And this isn't a legal hearing where we have narrow rules 
of evidence and we want to hear information that has relevant 
value, probative value and substantive value. So we feel that 
actually these motions [to limit evidence regarding off-duty 
conduct] have too much of a narrowing effect on the hearing." 
(Transcript P.33, L.9-20). Counsel for the Appellant then asked 
to strike the allegations of the assault and battery on Margo 
Bervall, because it occurred on off-duty time and it was 
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scandalous. (Transcript P.45, L.12-22). Subsequently, Counsel 
withdrew his motion for the reasons that he believed supporting 
documents had been submitted to the Council prior to the hearing. 
He stated: "I'll withdraw the motion, I'd assumed you had been 
given the same documents... that we had." (Transcript P.47, 
L.11-13). He then states: "Fine. Okay, then I'll withdraw 
that." (Transcript P.47, L.20-21). 
The Appellant fails to understand that off-duty conduct of 
a law enforcement officer is relevant to his employment because he 
is held to a higher standard of conduct than the average citizen. 
In fact, off-duty conduct alone may be sufficient to justify the 
termination of one's employment, particularly when that person 
occupies the position of a law enforcement officer for the State 
of Utah. The Supreme Court of Utah has upheld the termination of 
police officers for off-duty conduct in the following: Child v. 
Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission, 575 P.2d 195 (Utah, 
1978), off-duty altercation at a bar which resulted in the death 
of a citizen. Hutchinson v. Cartwright, 692 P.2d 772 (Utah, 1984) 
a jailor's conduct at a deposition resulted in termination. Lee 
v. Provo City Civil Service Commission, 582 P.2d 485 (Utah, 1978), 
Provo City Police Officer terminated for extra-marital 
relationship with a female dispatcher, e.g., In the Matter of the 
Discharge of Wayne L. Jones, 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah, 1986), Sheriff 
deputy's purchase under duress of jail inmate's property. 
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Courts throughout the United States recognize that 
off-duty conduct of a police officer may be grounds for 
termination. In the case of Philadelphia Civil Service Commission 
v. Wojtusik, 525 A.2d 1255 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987), the termination of 
an off-duty police officer was upheld because he struck a police 
officer who was attempting to place him under arrest. In Whitmore 
v. Civil Service Merit Board of Shelby, 673 S.W.2d 535 
(Tenn.1984), a police officer was terminated for theft of 
electricity from his residence. Respondents assert that 
Appellant7s argument that there is no nexus between his employment 
and his off-duty conduct is not well taken and the Court should 
rule that the Career Service Council acted with reason. 
IV 
THE CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL 
DECISION TO UPHOLD THE TERMINATION 
OF THE PETITIONER SHOULD BE UPHELD 
The Appellant argues that if the Court finds an "adequate 
showing of justification for the imposition of a penalty in this 
case, it is reasonable for the court to conclude that the penalty 
of termination should be mitigated downward substantially." The 
assertion misstates the law on all counts. The correct test to be 
applied is found in Vetterli v. Civil Service Commision of Salt 
Lake City, 145 P.2d 792 (Utah, 1944) and quoted in the case of the 
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Discharge of Wayne L. Jones, cited supra. The Supreme Court of 
Utah stated that a Civil Service Commission's authority on review 
of the disciplinary action involves an inquiry as to whether (1) 
the facts support the charges made by the department head, and if 
so, (2) whether the charges warrant the sanction imposed. The 
Court in Jones stated "The second Vetterli inquiry, whether the 
charges warrant the sanction imposed, is a limited one. The 
sheriff must manage and direct his deputies, and [he] is in the 
best position to know whether their actions merit discipline. If 
the Merit Commission finds upon review that the facts support the 
charges against the deputy, then it must affirm the sheriff's 
disciplinary action, unless it finds the sanction so clearly 
disproportionate to the charges as to amount to an abuse of the 
sheriff's discretion." (P.1363). Likewise, the County Attorney 
is in the best position to know whether the action of an 
investigator merits discipline and unless the termination is so 
clearly disproportionate to the charges that it amounts to an 
abuse of discretion, this Court must uphold the decision. 
Appellant in his brief refers to a Confidential Memorandum that it 
was the opinion of the Counsel for the County Attorney's office 
that a termination would not be sustainable. The reference to a 
attorney work product that was confidential is absolutely 
irrelevant. Counsel who prepared the memo did not hold a position 
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of authority to even recommend disciplinary action and said 
confidential memorandum was prepared prior to interviews with 
Margo Bergvall and Dave Nielsen. (See attached Objection to 
Petitioner's Motion For Leave to Submit New Evidence and 
accompanying affidavits marked as Addendum 4). 
A police officer must hold himself to a higher standard of 
conduct than the average citizen. This higher standard was 
recognized in the case of the Discharge of Jones. The Supreme 
Court quoted from The Law Enforcement Code of Ethics for police 
officers and stated, " The (Code) states, among other things, that 
a police officer will...keep my private life unsullied as an 
example to all" and "honest in thought and deed in both my 
personal and offical life, I will be exemplary in obeying the laws 
of the land...11 (P.1361, 1362). Evidence was also presented to 
the Career Service Council concerning this higher standard. All 
law enforcement personal called to testify recognized this higher 
standard including the Appellant. (Transcript P.730, L.21-25, 
P.731, L.5-8). Investigator Mike George, who worked with the 
Appellant at the Sheriffs Office and at the County Attorney's 
Office testified that: "We have a higher responsibility. 
Everything that we do as investigators is scrutinized by the 
courts. If you will, we are contained within a fishbowl....so we 
have to maintain ourselves to a higher standard. It comes with 
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our duty as police officers and representatives of the people of 
Salt Lake County." (Transcript P.759, L.5-10). Mike George was 
asked whether Ralph Tolman had brought unwarranted attention to 
the office of the County Attorney. He stated that he had 
constantly in the last six months. (Transcript P.759, L.21-25, 
P.760, L.l-3). 
Ralph Tolman's conduct either off-duty of driving under 
the influence of alcohol, assaulting Ms. Bergvall and Mr. Nielsen, 
or his heated verbal exchange with John Harrington cannot be 
condoned by any law enforcement organization and therefore 
Respondents assert that Appellant's sanction should not be 
mitigated. 
V 
PRIOR CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANT MAY BE 
USED IN PRESCRIBING THE SANCTION TO 
BE IMPOSED. 
The Appellant asserts that the County Attorney's office 
has used prior offenses where he had been previously disciplined 
prior to this action to terminate the Appellant. Respondents 
reply that of the six allegations, he was disciplined on only two, 
i.e., D.U.I, arrest of June 5, 1981, and a letter of reprimand for 
disobeying the directive to not use the County car for personal 
use. There is no single action upon which the Appellant was 
terminated, but several allegations of severe misconduct that were 
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public service. The Appellant asserts that the Respondents have 
violated the concept of Double Jeopardy by including the prior 
disciplinary actions and he cites several cases in from Illinois. 
However, a recent Illinois case allowed the use of prior 
disciplinary action in consideration of the sanction that was 
imposed. In the case of Price v. Board of Fire and Police 
Commissioners, 487 N.E.2d 673 (Ill.App.4 Dist. 1985), the Court 
stated in regards to the interpretation of a personnel statute: 
"Prohibition against double jeopardy is applicable only to 
criminal proceedings, and public employee disciplinary proceedings 
are civil in nature." (P.676). An employee's past record in a 
disciplinary proceeding cannot be utilized to prove a present 
charge, but it may be used to provide guidance to determining the 
appropriate penalty for the current offense. In the Matter of 
Wenderwicz, 478 A.2d 429 (N.J.Super.A.D.1984). 
CONCLUSION 
The Salt Lake County Career Service Council held a hearing 
concerning allegations of misconduct by the Appellant. The 
Appellant was given notice of the charges, he was allowed to go 
through his file at the County Attorney's office and a copies of 
all documents were made and given to him, (Transcript P.13, 
L.21-25, P.14, L.l-2). He was represented by counsel. He had the 
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and review the documents, 
-30-
and he had a fair hearing. The Appellant now comes before this 
Court and asks the Court to substitute its judgment for that of 
the Career Service Council. He asks this Court to believe his 
version of the facts, and he asks this Court to set aside the 
decision to uphold the termination. The Appellant also attacks 
the Findings of Fact as being "sketchy" and of no value. Findings 
of Fact may be general so long as they satisfy the dual 
requirements of making intelligent court review possible, and 
apprising the parties of the basis of the action taken. McQuillin 
Mun. Corp. Section 45.86 (3rd Ed). 
The correct review standard to be applied is set forth in 
Vetterli, to-wit: do the facts support the allegations, and if 
so, do the charges warrant the sanctions imposed. The review of 
the Career Service Council decision is a limited one. To allow 
otherwise would invite this Court to substitute its judgment on 
the merits for that of the inferior tribunal. (Career Service 
Council). This, a reviewing Court should not and cannot do. The 
Court may disturb the findings of the inferior tribunal only where 
those findings are not supported by the evidence. Lee v. Provo 
City, cited supra. 
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WHEREFORE, Respondents ask this Court to rule that the 
Salt Lake County Career Service Council did not exceed its 
jurisdiction or abuse its discretion and that the Court dismiss 
appellant's appeal. 
"" Uu^uJt, 1990 . 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
DATED this 0?* day of 
^ *± 
Vi Grf CAMPBELL' 
Jeputy ^County A t t o r n e y 
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11. ADDENDUM 
Notice of intent to terminate. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Decision. 
Summons and Petition For Extraordinary Relief. 
Objection to Petitioner's Motion For Leave to Submit 
New Evidence. 
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©ffxrs xrf the ^ a l i Take Camttu Attorn** / J ^ 2 % . 
T.L. "TED" CANNON Iff ^^^£<A$\ 
County Attorney 1 « \ (7?i \ l2 : j< i f | / - f j 
MICHAEL N. MARTINEZ 
Cltwt Deputy County Attorney 
September 8, 1986 
Ralph Tolman 
Salt Lake County Attorney's 
Office 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
SUBJECT: Notice of intent to terminate. 
Dear Ralph: 
This letter is to inform you .that pursuant to Sections 
17-33-5(3)(p) 1733-7(2)(e) and 17-33-10, U.C.A. (1953 as 
amended} and Salt Lake County Policy 5715, I am texminating 
your employment with the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
effective September 19. 1986. Your last working day at the 
office will be September 19, 1986. 
This decision-is based upon your continuing misconduct 
and acts inimical to public service; i.e., your D.U.I. -arrests 
and other incidences which reflect poorly upon this office, 
tarnishes the image thereof, and you have failed to obey 
reasonable orders of your supervisor. Because of your 
inappropriate behavior, this office is left with no alternative 
but to terminate your employment. Additionally, your acts 
reflect an emotional instability which not only present a 
danger to the citizens of Salt Lake County but places your 
status of a police officer in jeopardy. 
The specific incidences on which this office relies 
are as follows: 
1. On June 5, 1981, you were arrested by the Utah 
Highway Patrol for driving under the influence of alcohol. You 
subsequently pled guilty to a lesser included offense of 
reckless driving. You were verbally warned and given five days 
suspension by Don Sawaya. Chief Deputy of the Recovery 
Division, with the admonishment that any further acts of this 
Administration 
^oger A. Livingston 
3hief Oeouty County Attorney 
jjzc Administrative Affairs 
Mn Floor 
231 East 4th South Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 (801) 363-7900 
D County Attorney Victim Services 
Julie Brancn 
Director 
4tn Floor 
D Justice Division 
Waiter fl. Ellett 
Chief Deouty 
3rd Floor 
Q Investigative Agency 
Don Harman 
Soecial Agent in Charge 
4th Floor 
O Civil Division 
William R. Hyde 
Chief Deputy 
2nd Floor 
D Governmental Service: 
Donald Sawaya 
Chief Oeouty 
2nd Floor 
Ralph Tolman 
September 8, 1986 
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nature would result in your termination- (See attached memos 
of D.U.I, charges marlced as Attachment 1). 
2. In 1984 you were apprehended by the Midvale Police 
after you and your wife left the Sage Lounge. Sergeant Tim 
Short of the Midvale Police Department determined that you were 
too 'intoxicated to drive. Because of your position with this 
office, you were not arrested but allowed the opportunity to 
find another way home. 
3. On August 18 of this year, you were arrested by a 
Salt Lake City police officer for running a red light and 
Driving under the Influence. Your breathalizer test showed a 
.15 percent alcohol content. (See attached copies of police 
report marlced as Attachment 2). Certainly three D.U.I, 
offenses within six years demonstrates poor judgment by a 
police officer who is sworn to obey the law. 
4. On June 10, 1986, you assaulted and battered Margo 
Bergwall. This of.fice recognizes that relationships develop 
between adults, but your .actions in regards to Ms. Bergwall 
demonstrate ..an inability .to control your emotions. Clearly 
this office cannot tolerate your intimidations and threats made 
to Ms. Bergwall and her acquaintances. 
5. In a nemo .of January 1986, you and the other 
investigators were directed that County Attorney vehicles were 
not to be used for personal use or on the weekends. Your 
obvious disobedience of this directive has- been documented by 
Don Harmon, who checked your mileage on two different 
occasions. Furthermore, you were observed on August 9, 1986 at 
Ms. Bergwall^ residence in a County Attorney's Office 
vehicle. (See attached memos dated February 5, 1986 from Lt. 
Sam Dawson, and memo dated February 4, 1986 marked as 
Attachment 3). 
6. Your confrontation with John Harrington on October 
8, 1985 again demonstrates poor judgment by an investigator of 
this office. (See attached memo marked as Attachment 4). 
7. In September of 1982, you lied to your immediate 
supervisor concerning the transportation of a witness. Clearly 
this office must trust its employees to be truthful and this 
applies even more to one who is a sworn peace officer. (See 
attached memos marked as Attachment 5). 
It is for the above stated reasons that it is this 
office's decision to terminate your employment. You have the 
right to have a pretermination hearing to present any 
mitigating factor in your favor. Said hearing will be held 10 
o'clock Friday, September 12, 1986. In the event that your 
Ralph Tolman 
September 8 • 1986 
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explanations do not mitigate the above charges, your 
termination will be effective on the date first above written. 
Please find attached a copy of Salt Lake County Policy 
5705, entitled Grievance Procedure. -This action will be heard 
at thje department review level. 
Sincerely, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
* T. L. "Ted" Cannon 
(0923J) 
BEFORE THE SALT LAKE COUNTY ilC'jSl* 
CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL DEC 2-' 
COUMTY A 
n\\t\\ p 
IN RE: Appeal of : FINDIN&S'OF FACT, 
RALPH TOLMAN CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
: AND DECISION 
: Case No. 8&-15 
This matter came on for near1no before the Salt LaKe County 
Career Service Council on Novemoer 5. 1986 aria conduced on 
November 19, 1986. Council members. Snerri R. Guyon, willard 
J. Homer, and Rooert S. Aaams were present. Appellant. Raloh 
To1man, was present ana represented bv his counsel L. Zane Bill, 
attorney for the Utah Public tmoioyee's Association. The Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office was represented DV Don Sawava, as 
Deoartrnent representative, ari^t Jerry Campbell, Deouty Countv 
Attorney. Testimony was given, facts were adduced, exhibits were 
receivea, and otherwise being fully aoorised in the matter, the 
Council nereoy enters its Finomas of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Decision. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Aopeliant. Ralnh To 1 man. was hirea as ar\ Investi-
gator for tne Salt Lake County Attomev* s Orfice on Ann-. 1. 
1980. 
S. That the responsibilities ana auties of an Invest i cator 
were the same responsibilities ana duties as a law enforcement 
officer m the State of Utan and tnat the position of Salt LaKe 
County Investigator reauirea peace officer certification. 
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3. That on tne early morning hours of June 5, 1981, Raich 
Tolrnan. who was not on duty with tne Salt Lake County Attorney's 
Office, was arrested bv tne Lit an Highway Patrol for driving under 
the influence of alcohol. Mr. Tolrnan had been driving a Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office vehicle and had a firearm in the 
glove box. Mr. Tolrnan was verbally warned and aiven five days 
susoension DV tne Salt Lake County Attorney's Office after he had 
olead guilty to a lessor offense of reckless driving. 
4. In 1983 or 1984, Ralon Tolrnan was observed bv two 
Officers of the Midvale Police Deoartrnent exiting the Sage 
Lounge. One of the officers testified tnat he observed 
Mr. Tolrnan stagger towards a vehicle, enter the vehicle, and 
start its engine, whereupon they blocked the vehicle from leaving 
the area. The other officer testified that he saw Mr. Tolrnan 
exit tne Lounge and that he saw the brake lights of Mr. Tolrnan's 
vehicle. 
This Council believes tne Of f icer .= version of the events at 
the Sage Lounge when they indicated Raioh Tolrnan was in fact 
behind tne wneei of tne vehicle and was attemotmo to leave. 
This Council further believes tne Officer's version that 
Mr. Tolrnan was in fact intoxicated from alconol and that haa he 
not Qfseri ar\ Investigator for Salt LaK.e County, he would nave b&en 
arrested by tne Officers of Midvale. 
5. On August 18, 1986, Mr. Tolrnan was arrested for driving 
under the influence of alcohol at aooroximateiv l7th Soutn and 
11th East. His blood alcohol level was . l5£. Mr. Tolrnan 
admitted tnat he had olead guilty to an alcohol-related reckless 
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drivmg offense. This Council notes tnat on ftuqust IS, 1966, 
RalDh To1man was not on duty nor was he on duty in the incident 
at the Sage Lounge in Midvale. 
6. In regards to the alienations of June 10, 1986, this 
Council finds that Raloh Tolman did assault and batter a female 
acquaintance and her male friend at her home while Mr. Tolman was 
off duty. However, on the day of June 11, 1986, while Raloh 
Tolman was on duty, he entered ner^ home and assaulted and 
battered her male friend. The facts were that Raloh Tolman was 
on his way to work on June 11, 1986, in a Salt Laxe County 
Attorney's vehicle when he stopped his car at the female 
acauamtance* s house at aoDroxirnately 8:00 a. m arid enterea the 
home. The Council finds that in regards to this incident. 
Mr. Tolman used Door judgment ana that nis actions const ltuteci 
acts inimical to DUD lie service. 
7. In January of 1986, Ralpn Tolman and the other Invest-
igators were instructed not to use their County vehicles for 
personal use. The facts were that Raloh Tolman used his vehicle 
on three separate occasions for his own personal use aria this was 
m violation of a direct order from a supervisor, a clear act of 
msuDordination. Nothing was presented Dy the Appellant which 
would mitigate his actions for disobevina a direct order. 
8. The Council further finds that Mr. Tolman exhibited 
very poor behavior when he launched a verbal attack acainst a 
local news reporter on October 8, 1985. Clearly. Ralph Tolman 
was the instigator of a very heated argument. The Council finds 
that the location of the incident comoined with the fact that a 
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well-known trial was being held in tne close proximity demon-
strates not only a lack of good judgment, but also constitutes 
acts that would bring discredit and disfavor to the County 
Attorney's Office. The actions showed a lack of professionalism 
as a law enforcement officer. The Council notes that tne 
incident with the local news reporter occurred while Mr. Tolrnan 
was on duty and that the evidence was clear that Mr. Tolrnan had 
not been drinking, thus, alcohol was not a contributing factor in 
the Appellant's behavior. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
This Council, will apply the law of the State of Utah as set 
forth in Vetterli_y. Cwj,i_Seryice_C^ yi!i§?_City, 
145 P.£d 79£ (1945). This Council believes that tne Respondent. 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, has satisfied the reauire-
ments of Vetterl.i. in that (1) tne allegations against Ralph 
Tolrnan by the Salt Lake County Attorney1 s Office were not only 
supported by the facts but that they ";ere not controverted; (£) 
the action taken, the termination of Ralph Tolrnan, was 
warranted. It is this Council's opinion -chat a law enforcement 
officer is held to a hiaher standard of responsibility than tne 
average citizen and that the higher standard of duty is evident 
in tne Law Enforcement Code of Etnics wherein it states in part 
that a police officer will keep his private life unsullied as 
ari example to all and that he will be exemplary in obeying the 
laws of the land. 
This Council believes that tne actions by Mr. Tolrnan in 
regards to the assault incident and tne veroal confrontation with 
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the news reporter, in adaition to the DUI arrests, demonstrate 
very ooor judgment Dy Raloh To1man and brines discredit to and 
tarnishes tne image of the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. 
The totality of the allegations against Ralph Tolman 
demonstrated a pattern of conduct wnich meritea termination from 
the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. His actions aid 
constitute acts inimical to tne public service. Each alienation 
individually may not alone be sufficient to merit termination, 
but combined together, they present a pattern of misconduct bv 
the Appellant which warrants the action taken. 
The relationship between the off-duty conduct and 
Mr. Tolman's position as a Salt Lake County Attorney Investigator 
was clear. Certainly, a police officer or County Attorney's 
Investigator has a higher duty to obey tne laws than that of the 
average citizen. When off-duty conduct is brought to the 
attention of the public which casts a poor image upon public 
service or in this case the Salt Lane Countv Attorney's Office, 
the agency is justified in tne termination action. 
This Council is not persuaaed nor do we find any facts to 
support the contentions of the Appellant that he was terminated 
as a result of his political supoort of a local candidate or tnat 
his actions should De excused oecause he had consumed alcohol. 
No facts were presented to show that Ralpn Tolman was an 
alcoholIC 
In fact, the Council concludes tnat alcohol is not a 
contributing factor to Mr. Tolman's unprofessional conduct. This 
conclusion is based upon comparing the incident of tne verbal 
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exchange Detween Mr. Tolrnan with tne news reoorter wnere the 
Appellant had not been drinking to the incidents with the female 
acquaintance wnere he had been drinkina, demonstrate lack of 
judgment and conduct unbecoming a police officer. 
DECISION 
This Council, therefore, unanimously finds that the 
Resoondent's alienations are suooortable bv tne facts and that 
the sanctions imoosed-of termination were warrantea. 
Dated tmsji KJL day of De 
SHERRI R. BUYQN/Cha<ir ~4 (Ar^ 
R0BERf^irTa^Ss7Membe™*Tp^" 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hpredy certify that I nave mailed a true and exact cooy of 
the foregoing Finaings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision 
to Zane Sill, counsel for Appellant: Jerry CamDOeli, counsel for 
Department, SLYIO J. D. Johnson, Director of tne County Human 
Resources Division, this » ^ day of December, 1966. 
-y 
ATES/ Coordinator 
Kg£SafeE~ DATE 
UPON .,<feV%^ 6 ft-rVf —• 
SINB^OEPUTY CONSTABLE Sa. COUNTS UTAH 
L. Zane Gill (3716) of /^y/^7^ PE^  
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH / 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 328-1666
 Cc 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT ° ' - ^ H 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY CAREER SERVICE-
COUNCIL and SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ATTORNEY, 
Respondents. 
SUMMONS 
C i v i l No. 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO. THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT SALT LAKE COUNTY CAREER 
SERVICE COUNCIL: 
You are hereby summoned.and r e q u i r e d t o s e r v e upon or mail t o 
Plaintiff 's attorney at 50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor, Salt Lake Ci ty , 
Utah 84101, an answer in writing to the Petition for Extraordinary Relief 
and f i l e a copy of said answer with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court 
within Twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you. I f you 
fai l to so do, Judgment by Default will be taken against you for the rel ief 
demanded in said Pet i t ion, which has been f i l ed with the Clerk of the 
Court, and a copy of which is hereto annexed and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this 2J_ day of January 1988. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
A 
Defendant's Address: 
Salt Lake County Career Service Council 
2001 South State Street 
L\Zane Gill ^ _ 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
L. Zane Gill of 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-1666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH TOLMAN, ] 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY CAREER SERVICE ] 
COUNCIL, and SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ATTORNEY, ) 
Respondents. 
1 PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY 
1 RELIEF 
i Civil No. 
i Judge 
Petitioner, Ralph Rolman, by and through his counsel of record, L. 
Zane Gill of Biele, Has 1am & Hatch, brings this action pursuant to Rule 
65B(b)2 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The jurisdiction of this 
Court is sought on the basis that the Salt Lake County Career Service 
Counsel, an inferior tribunal, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded 
its jurisdiction and/or abused its discretion. 
PARTIES 
1. The petitioner Ralph Tolman is an individual residing at all 
relevant times in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. The respondent Salt Lake County Career Service Council is an 
agency of Salt Lake County government whose function i t 1s to hear adminis-
t ra t ive appeals of employment grievance matters within Salt Lake County 
government. At the time relevant to. this matter, the members of the Salt 
Lake County Career Service Council were Robert Adams, Sherry Guyon and 
Willard Homer. The Salt Lake County Career Service Council is named as an 
entity and the individuals comprising.the council are not named individ-
ually. 
3. Respondent Salt Lake bounty Attorney is the elected county 
official responsible-for the operations of the Salt Lake County At torney^ 
office", the former employer of petitioner Ralph Tolman. 
BASIS OF THIS ACTION 
1. Petitioner Ralpfr TolmaTf was hired by the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's office on A p r i l : 1 , 1980 after having served as a Salt Lake 
County Deputy Sheriff for several years* 
2.- The Salt Lake County -Attorney's office, through its elected 
County Attorney, Ted L. Cannon, instituted termination proceedings against 
petitioner allegedly based upon conduct violative of the law enforcement 
code of ethics. The charges against petitioner were set forth in a notice 
of intent to terminate dated September 8, 1986. A copy of that document is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
3. Preliminary hearings and a grievance hearing were held in this 
matter before the Salt Lake County Career Service Council in October and 
November 1986. 
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4. A f inal decision of the Salt Lake County Career Service 
Council was rendered on December 3, 1986. A copy of the findings of f a c t , 
conclusions of law and decision is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
5. On December 23, 1986, petitioner f i led a notice of appeal with 
the clerk's off ice of Salt Lake County with the intent of commencing an 
appeal of the final order of the Salt take County Career Service Council 
pursuant to Rule 73(h) of the Utah Rul.es of Civi l Procedure. A case 
f i l e was opened in that matter, case no. C-86-9430. In that act ion, Ralph 
Tolman sought a review of the final administrative order of the Salt Lake 
County Career Service Council and named as respondent Salt Lake County 
Attorney's office. 
6. On December 2, 1987, the Salt Lake County Attorney's office 
made a motion to dismiss the petitioner's appeal in case no. C-86-9430. A 
hearing was held on that motion on Friday, January 8, 1988, before the 
Honorable Judge Moffat. Petitioner's appeal was dismissed without pre ju -
dice. 
7. In the process of preparing his appeal in the action which has 
now been dismissed, petitioner obtained the tape recorded record of the 
hearings held before the Salt Lake County Career Service Council. Pet i -
tioner's counsel attempted to make a written transcript from those tape 
recordings; however, the quality of the tape recording was so poor that the 
transcript has l i t t l e value as a reference document. 
8. The Career Service Council committed reversible error by 
fail ing to rule before the evidentiary hearing on pet i t ioner 's motion 
regarding "nexus." 
-3-
9. The Career Service Council committed reve rs ib le e r ro r by 
fa i l i ng to consider i t s legal obligation to mitigate penalt ies. 
10. The Career Service Council committed reve rs ib le e r ro r by 
f a l l i ng t o rule that the County Attorney's o f f i c e may not impose double 
jeopardy for events which are the subject of former d isc ip l ine . 
11. The Career Service'Council committed revers ib le e r ro r by 
conducting the hearing in such a manner as to deprive the pet i t ioner of his 
-employment -without-^tie-ppocess of law-* 
12. The Career Service Council committed reve rs ib le e r ro r by 
allowing key portions of the testimony against p e t i t i o n e r t o be entered 
in to the record through hearsay and then basing i t s ult imate decision upon 
the events to which the hearsay related. 
WHEREFORE, petitioner requests 
1 . That a w r i t iVsife d i rec t i ng the Salt Lake County Career 
Service C o u n c i l i t s members and employees,-to-certify f u l l y to th i s Court, 
with.ln 30 days, a w r i t t en t r ansc r i p t of the record and proceedings held 
before i t . 
2. That t h i s Court conduct a review of the t r a n s c r i p t of the 
hearing before the Career Service.Council, consider the memorandum of law 
to be f i l ed at a la ter date by pet i t ioner, take oral argument on the issues 
raised herein, render a decision and order compelling the Salt Lake County 
Career Service Council to reverse i t s decision sustaining the termination 
of the peti t ioner and issue amended findings of f a c t , conclusions of law 
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and an order compelling the Salt Lake County Attorney's office to reinstate 
the petitioner with full back pay and benefits and reasonable attorney's 
fees. 
DATED this *2\f day of January 1988. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
LViZa'pe 6111 * 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
JERRY G. CAMPBELL (#0555) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State, #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Telephone: (801) 468-2653 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CAREER SERVICE 
COUNCIL and SALT LAKE 
COUNTY ATTORNEY, 
Respondents. 
OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
SUBMIT NEW EVIDENCE 
Civil No. C-88-373 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Respondant, Salt Lake County Attorney, hereby objects to 
Petitioner's Motion for an order allowing the submission of 
alleged new evidence on the basis that a memorandum written 
by deputy Jerry G. Campbell to Bill Hyde is irrelevant, 
immaterial and constitutes attorney work product. 
This Motion is more fully set forth in the accompanying 
memoranda. 
DATED this / day of September, 1989. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
Bv (_/SsU^\ t / (SVL.CSX»/.JC/.£# 
JEpRY G. CAMPBELL / 
Deputy County Attorney 
OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION 
Civil No. C-88-373 
Page two 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this day of September, 
1989, a copy of the foregoing Objection to Petitioner's 
Motion For Leave to Submit New Evidence was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
L. Zane Gill 
Attorney for Petitioner 
50 West Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
; ? u 4 u ^ 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
JERRY G. CAMPBELL (#0555) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State, #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Telephone: (801) 468-2653 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CAREER SERVICE 
COUNCIL and SALT LAKE 
COUNTY ATTORNEY, 
Respondents. 
MEMORANDA IN OPPOSITION 
TO PETITIONER'S MOTION 
TO SUBMIT NEW EVIDENCE 
Civil No. C-88-373 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Respondent, Salt Lake County Attorney by and through its 
attorney, Jerry G. Campbell, hereby responds to Petitioner's 
Motion for leave to submit new evidence in the above-entitled 
matter. 
The Petitioner requests this Court to rule that he may 
submit a confidential memorandum dated September 6, 1986, 
from Jerry Campbell, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, to 
William R. Hyde, Chief Deputy of the Civil Division. 
FACTS 
In September of 1986, Jerry G. Campbell's immediate 
supervisor was Ralph Crockett who responded to the division 
chief, William R. Hyde (see attached affidavits of William 
R. Hyde and Jerry G. Campbell). 
MEMORANDA IN OPPOSITION 
Civil No. C-88-373 
Page 2 
This inter-office memo was written prior to the notice 
of intent to terminate Ralph Tolman. The memo discussed the 
allegations and probabilities of success under the 
circumstances that existed in late August of 1986. The Memo 
was reviewed by William R. Hyde, Donald Sawaya, Chief Deputy 
of the Governmental Services Division, and Donald Harmon, 
Chief Agent in charge of the Investigative Division. 
It was the opinion of Don Harmon, Bill Hyde and Don 
Sawaya that Ralph Tolman should be terminated from his 
employment with the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office and 
if the evidence did not sustain the termination before the 
Salt Lake County Career Service Council, the office would 
accept the results. Jerry Campbell did not have the 
authority to decide whether or not to terminate or recommend 
disciplinary action. 
Subsequent to the memo of September 6, 1986, Jerry 
Campbell and Sam Dawson of the Investigative Division 
interviewed Margo Bergvall and Dave Nielsen concerning the 
allegation of assault and battery. At this interview, it 
was determined that an additional incident on June 11, 1986, 
had occurred. Said notice of intent to terminate was 
subsequently amended before the Salt Lake County Career 
Service Council (Transcript p.14, L.22-25; p.15, L.l-5, 
19-25; p.19, L.l-3; p.33, L.21-23). The second incident on 
MEMORANDA IN OPPOSITION 
Civil No. C-88-373 
Page 3 
June 11, 1986, occurred at approximately 8:00 a.m when Ralph 
Tolman was on his way to work. He forced entry into Margo 
Bergvall's house and proceeded to assault Dave Nielsen, said 
acts constituting elements of a burglary. 
Subsequent to the Notice of Termination, William R. Hyde 
was appointed by the Salt Lake County Commission as Acting 
Salt Lake County Attorney (Transcript p.376, L.22-25; p.377, 
L.l-7). William R. Hyde reviewed the allegations of the 
Notice of Termination and had the authority to rescind or 
amend the disciplinary action. William Hyde concluded that 
there were sufficient allegations to proceed with the 
termination (Transcript p.381, L.2-11). 
The confidential inter-office memo was written on 
September 6, 1986, and had no bearing on the decision of the 
Salt Lake County Career Service Council. Additionally, new 
information was discovered after its origination. 
COUNTY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT 
The Salt Lake County Career Service Council is an 
independent body created by the County Personnel Management 
Act, Section 17-33-1 et.seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. §17-33-4 gives them the power to resolve all 
employee disputes. The Council is empowered to make "final, 
binding appeal decisions" to the Board of County 
Commissioners. The Council must render a decision based 
MEMORANDA IN OPPOSITION 
Civil No- C-88-373 
Page 4 
upon the evidence before it and there is nothing contained 
in the record filed with this Court indicating they did 
otherwise. 
The confidential inter-office memo discussing the points 
of termination, their strengths and weaknesses, written by 
an attorney who was not in a position to recommend 
disciplinary action is not relevant or material to the 
decision made by the Salt Lake County Career Service Council 
and said memo is governed by the Attorney Work Product rule. 
DATED this / day of September, 1989. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
Deputy Co*unty Attorney 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this day of September, 
1989, a copy of the Memoranda in Opposition to Petitioner's 
Motion For Leave to Submit New Evidence was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
L. Zane Gill 
Attorney for Petitioner 
50 West Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^Z^TU^ 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
JERRY G. CAMPBELL (#0555) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State, #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Telephone: (801) 468-2653 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CAREER SERVICE 
COUNCIL and SALT LAKE 
COUNTY ATTORNEY, 
Respondents. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No- C-88-373 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Affiant, WILLIAM R. HYDE, being duly sworn, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. That he is the Chief Deputy of the Civil Division, 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. 
2. That in September of 1986, Jerry G. Campbell's 
immediate supervisor was Ralph Crockett. 
3. That he was Ralph Crockett's immediate supervisor in 
September of 1986. 
4. That on September 6, 1986, he received a 
confidential inter-office memo from Jerry G. Campbell, 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM R. HYDE 
Civil No. C-88-373 
Page 2 
Deputy County Attorney, regarding termination of Ralph 
Tolman. The memo analyzed the allegations and questioned 
whether termination would be sustainable. The memo was 
reviewed by Donald Sawaya, Chief Deputy of the Governmental 
Services Division, Donald Harmon, Chief Agent in charge of 
the Investigative Division, and your affiant. It was their 
decision and recommendation to the County Attorney that 
Ralph Tolman be terminated from his employment with the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office. 
5. That Jerry G. Campbell did not have the authority to 
recommend termination or hiring of any individual. 
6. That subsequent to the Notice of Termination, he was 
appointed Acting Salt Lake County Attorney with authority to 
rescind or amend the disciplinary action. 
7. That your affiant reviewed the allegations of the 
Notice of Intent to Terminate and concluded that the 
circumstances of the allegations warranted termination of 
Ralph Tolman. 
8. That the confidential memo was an analysis of 
pending litigation within the County Attorney's Office. 
Said memo was not authorized to be released nor was it 
written for publication. 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM R. HYDE 
Civil No. C-88-373 
Page 3 
. » < 
DATED this day of September, 198.9 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this f ** day of 
September, 1989. 
NOTARY PUBLIC, residing in S/lt 
Lake County, State/of Utah 
^XCINDY G. YOUNGREN 
3631 Summer Hilt Or San LJKe City. Utah 8412^ 
My Commission Expires 
November 2 1992 
STATE OF UTAH t 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
JERRY G. CAMPBELL (#0555) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State, #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Telephone: (801) 468-2653 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Petitioner, 
vs • 
SALT LAKE CAREER SERVICE 
COUNCIL and SALT LAKE 
COUNTY ATTORNEY, 
Respondents. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. C-88-373 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Affiant, JERRY G. CAMPBELL, being duly sworn, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. That he is a Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney. 
2. That during September of 1986, his immediate 
supervisor in the Civil Division was Ralph Crockett who 
responded to division chief, William R. Hyde-. 
3. That on September 6, 1986, he wrote a confidential 
inter-office memo to William R. Hyde regarding the 
termination of Ralph Tolman. The memo analyzed the 
AFFIDAVIT OF JERRY G. CAMPBELL 
Civil No. C-88-373 
Page 2 
allegations and questioned whether termination would be 
sustainable. 
4. That the memo was reviewed by William R. Hyde, 
Donald Sawaya, Chief Deputy of the Governmental Services 
Division, and Donald Harmon, Chief Agent in charge of the 
Investigative Division and it was their opinion and 
recommendation that Ralph Tolman be terminated from the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's office. 
5. That he did not have the authority to recommend 
termination or hiring of any individual. 
6. That the confidential memorandum dated September 6, 
1986, to William R. Hyde, was not written for dissemination 
to any person other than those listed in this Affidavit. 
The memo prepared by your affiant analyzed the charges 
listed against Ralph Tolman and did not consider additional 
information dicovered at a later date. 
DATED this / day of September, 1989. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JERRY G* CAMPBELL 
C i v i l No- C-88-373 
Page 3 
S u b s c r i b e d and sworn to b e f o r e me 
September, 1989 . 
ommW&PWIB&reb CINDY G. YOUNGREN 
3631 Summer Hill Or 
OattLako City. Utah 8*121 
My Commission Expires 
November 2,1992 
MaT^^ROFUTAH 
NOTARY PU 
Salt Lak 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
JERRY G. CAMPBELL, being duly sworn, states that he is the 
attorney for Respondent Salt Lake County Attorney and that he served 
four (4) copies of the Brief of Respondent Salt Lake County Attorney 
upon L. Zane Gill, Attorney for Appellant, 50 West Broadway, #900, 
Salt Lake^City, Utah 84101, by delivering true copies thereof, on 
the _jL5day of fak^^ , 1990. 
Vi G4 CAMPBELL 
Deputy^County Attorney 
Attorney for Respondent 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day 
of , 1990. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
My commission expires: 
